












Although	 there	 is	 strong	 scientific	 consensus	 that	 climate	 change	 and	 environmental	
degradation	are	occurring,	there	is	also	a	significant	body	of	opinion	that	is	sceptical	about,	
or	 denies	 the	 validity	 of,	 evidence	 for	 this.	However	 it	 is	 not	 solely	 the	 nature	 of	 differing	
views	about	global	warming	or	ecological	disaster	that	is	being	contested	but	the	case	for	or	
against	intervention	and	regulation	in	the	market.	At	an	international	level,	gestures	toward	
‘sustainability’	 are	 (i)	 compromised	 by	 combining	 them	with	 declarations	 of	 the	 need	 for	
continued	 economic	 growth,	 and	 (ii)	 undermined	 by	 the	 arrangements	 put	 in	 place	 by	
















South	 N	 (2016)	 Free	 trade	 agreements,	 private	 courts	 and	 environmental	 exploitation:	














The	 psychology	 of	 ‘turning	 a	 blind	 eye’	 or	 ‘looking	 the	 other	 way’	 is	 a	 tricky	
matter.	These	phrases	imply	that	we	have	access	to	reality,	but	choose	to	ignore	it	
because	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 do	 so.	 …	 ‘Knowing’,	 though,	 can	 be	 far	 more	





be	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 First,	 the	 planet	 is	 suffering	 the	 consequences	 of	 various	 forms	 of	
environmental	degradation	and	over‐exploitation;	notable	among	these	is	the	process	of	climate	















resolution	 mechanisms.	 The	 third	 part	 of	 the	 paper	 reviews	 explanations	 for	 denial	 and	 the	
rejection	of	scientific	evidence,	and	how	this	way	of	looking	at	the	world	also	often	embraces	a	
view	 of	 the	 market	 in	 keeping	 with	 neo‐liberal	 principles.	 The	 paper	 concludes	 by	 applying	




On	 an	 international	 scale,	 the	 ongoing,	 ecodical	 impacts	 of	 global	 ‘business	 as	 usual’,	 serving	
corporate	and	 state	 interests	 and	both	 creating	 and	 responding	 to	 the	power	 and	patterns	of	
everyday	aspiration	and	consumption,	all	occur	despite	well‐known	evidence	of	consequences	





















2016)	but	the	ideas	of	 ‘fragmentation’	and	 ‘disconnection’	 in	relation	to	 international	 levels	of	
law	and	environmental	policy	can	be	explored	further.		
	
Fragmentation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 used	 here	 in	 the	 senses	 found	 in	 psychiatry	 or	 psychology	
(Campbell	2009:	392;	Psychology	Dictionary	n.d.)	although	these	have	perhaps	been	influential	
in	 shaping	 sociological	 understandings.	 So,	 for	 example,	 Fuchs	 (2007:	 385)	 refers	 to	 Richard	
Sennett’s	 (1998)	observations	on	 some	of	 the	characteristics	of	 a	post‐modern	 society,	which	
Sennett	sees	as	corrosive	of	‘qualities	of	character	which	bind	human	beings	to	one	another	and	
furnishes	 each	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 sustainable	 self’	 (Sennett	 1998:	 27).	 Thus,	 for	 Sennett,	 the	
experience	of	time	has	now	become	‘disjointed’	and	threatens	‘the	ability	of	people	to	form	their	
characters	into	sustained	narratives’	(Sennett	1998:	31);	this	makes	us	‘pliant’	personalities	that	
represent	 ‘a	 collage	 of	 fragments’,	 ‘suited	 to	 short‐term	work	experience,	 flexible	 institutions,	
and	 constant	 risk‐taking’	 (Sennett	 1998:	 133).	 Increasingly,	 as	 Fuchs	 (2007:	 385)	 remarks,	
‘individuals	 …	 “compartmentalize”	 their	 lives,	 their	 relationships	 and	 their	 attitudes,	without	
striving	 for	coherence.	Simultaneously	or	successively,	they	 live	 in	very	different	worlds	that	are	
not	related	to	one	another’	(emphasis	added).	
	
This	 last	 point	 is	 what	 I	 mean	 by	 ‘disconnection’.	 In	 fact	 we	 do	 all	 share	 one	 real,	 physical,	
material	world	–	and,	like	it	or	not,	we	are	all	‘connected’	to	it.	But	in	relation	to	understanding	





motivate	 and	 guide	 us	 to	 see	 why	 we	 need	 to	 respond	 to	 global	 issues	 like	 environmental	
degradation	and	climate	change.	As	Norgaard	(2006:	362)	observes:	
	
Environmentalists	 have	 described	 how	Western	 societies’	 failure	 to	 think	 on	 a	
longer	 time	 scale	 is	 part	 of	 why	 we	 have	 created	 long‐term	 environmental	
degradation	such	as	nuclear	waste.	In	contrast,	the	Iroquois	nation	is	reputed	to	
make	 decisions	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 how	 they	would	 affect	 people	 living	 7	
generations	in	the	future.	
	
Temporality	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 future	 generations	 (Bell	 2012;	 Brisman	 and	 South	
2015b)	 but	 also	 to	 the	 choices	made	 now	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 those	 rights	 and	 enable	 future	
generations	to	have	some	choices	left	(for	example,	Shue	2014).	But	at	present,	the	problems	of	





and	 others	 confronting	 the	 tendencies	 of	 law	 and	 rights	 discourse	 to	 separate	
issues	into	conceptual	and	institutional	silos,	while	the	powerful	tendencies	of	a	





the	 mechanisms	 of	 international	 trade	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 calls	 to	 control	 and	 reduce	
climate	change	harms.	As	an	example	of	this,	consider	the	position	(and	indeed	job	remit)	of	the	
UK	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change.	 As	 Dyke	 (2015)	 points	 out,	 the	






the	 extraction	 of	 fossil	 fuels,	 while	 also	 being	 legally	 obliged	 to	 reduce	 emissions	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	2008	Climate	Change	Act’.		
	




regimes	 have	 separate	 negotiation	 fora,	 separate	 enforcement	 regimes,	 separate	 dispute	
resolution	methods	and	remain	largely	autonomous	from	general	international	law’.		
	
De	 Schutter	 (2014)	 recognises	 that	 current	 patterns	 of	 trade	 reflect	 north‐south	 relations	 of	
exploitation,	based	on	a	history	of	colonialism,	but	argues	that	these	patterns	will	change	as	the	
market	itself	becomes	a	tool	to	enforce	compliance	with	climate‐friendly	requirements	such	as	
use	 of	 clean	 technologies,	 support	 for	 south‐south	 trade,	 and	 diversification	 of	 developing	




paradoxical	 downsides,	 not	 least	 the	 reliance	 of	most	 new	 e‐technologies	 on	metals	 that	 are	
extracted	 from	 the	 earth	 in	 these	 same	 over‐exploited	 nations	 and	 regions,	 accompanied	 by	





Bandura	 (2016)	 shows	 how	 people	 and	 organizations	 can	 employ	 distortions	 of	 moral	
argument	 and	 manipulation	 of	 language	 to	 disengage	 from	 the	 harmful	 possibilities	 of	 their	
activities.	In	a	different	way	but	with	a	similar	outcome,	Rayner	(2012:	112)	has	described	how	
‘diverse	 principles’	 and	 ‘constructive	 ambiguities’	 can	 co‐exist	 in	 various	 ways	 that	 enable	
different	 organizations	 to	work	 alongside	 each	other	 by	 finding	 grounds	 for	 compromise	 and	








United	 Nations	 Environment	 Programme	 (UNEP),	 Mr	 Achim	 Steiner.	 According	 to	 the	 WTO	
Press	Release	(WTO	2015),	both	‘emphasized	the	need	to	redouble	efforts	at	all	levels	to	ensure	




societies,	 and	 economies	 are	 not	 separate.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 inextricably	 linked.	
Their	 vision	was	 of	 global	 cooperation	 in	 trade	 as	 a	means	 to	 unleash	 growth,	











How,	 then,	 do	 recent	 proposals	 to,	 as	 the	 Director	 General	 puts	 it,	 further	 ‘unleash	 growth’,	
measure	up	to	this	aspiration?		
	
First,	 this	 shared	 platform	brings	 together	what	may	 seem	 antithetical	 positions	 to	 declare	 a	
united	 ambition	 to	 solve	 all	 the	worlds’	 problems	 –	 but	without	having	 to	 change	 any	 of	 the	
causes	 of	 these.	 This	 reflects	 three	 key	 points	 related	 to	 fragmentation	 and	 disconnection:	 a	
desire	to	preserve	 ‘business	as	usual’;	the	imperative	that	any	need	for	fundamental	change	is	
downplayed;	and,	the	final	element,	that	all	of	this	represents	an	assurance	that	when	necessary,	




This	 fits	 perfectly	 with	 Ruggiero’s	 (2015:	 99‐100)	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 powerful	 can	 justify	
detrimental	or	criminal	activities.	As	Ruggiero	says:	
	
The	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 …	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 result	 of	 proximity	 among	
actors,	mutual	 trust,	 imitation,	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 perpetuate	 bonds,	 values	 and	
group	 interests.	 …	 Proper	 philosophical	 and	 political	 justification	 requires	 that	
partial	concerns	and	 factional	gains	be	depicted	as	beneficial	 to	 the	collectivity;	
therefore	 it	 entails	 agreed	 upon	 definitions	 of	 the	 common	 good	 and	 the	
identification	of	higher	common	principles.		
	









to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 which,	 as	 noted,	 is	 a	 serious	 contributor	 to	 environmental	
degradation	and	climate	change.	Second,	secrecy	and	private	justice	are	all	undermining	of,	and	
actually	 opposed	 to,	 transparency.	 Third,	 the	 proposed	 removal	 of	 barriers	 to	 trade	will	 also	
entail	 (formally	or	 informally,	 legally	or	 illegally)	removal	of	various	protections	of	 forest	and	
water	resources	as	well	as	rights	of	Indigenous	peoples.	Fourth,	in	this	sense,	these	agreements	












of	 courts,	 operating	 secret	 offshore	 tribunals	 (Crouch	 2014;	 Monbiot	 2015).	 At	 present	 in	
Australia	 and	 Uruguay	 the	 tobacco	 company	 Phillip	 Morris	 is	 suing	 because	 of	 measures	














water	 supply	 and	 take‐over	 by	 the	 Californian	 firm	 of	 Bechtel.	 This	 well‐known	 episode	 of	
callous	exploitation	is	described	elsewhere	(for	example,	in	McClanahan	et	al.	2015)	but	in	ways	
that	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 contest	 around	 the	 period	 of	 privatization	 and	 conflicts	 between	
military	and	police	and	protestors.	However	the	origins	of	the	deal	are	pertinent	here	and	lie	in	
conditions	imposed	by	the	World	Bank	in	1997	which,	in	return	for	investment	in	the	nation’s	
water	 service,	 required	 Bolivia	 ‘to	 offer	 a	 40‐year	 lease	 to	 Bechtel	with	 a	 guaranteed	 annual	
profit	of	16	per	cent’.	When	Bechtel	withdrew	as	a	result	of	protests	and	bad	publicity,	 it	then	
sought	to	use	a	World	Bank	trade	court	to	claim	US$1	million	it	argued	it	had	invested	in	Bolivia	
as	 well	 as	 a	 further	 US$50	million	 that	 it	 calculated	 as	 foregone	 future	 profits.	 In	 response,	
further	 counter	 campaigns	 followed	 nationally	 and	 internationally	 and	 eventually	 Bechtel	
withdrew	 from	 the	 process.	 What	 the	 case	 drew	 attention	 to	 was	 not	 merely	 the	 fact	 that	











agreement	 with	 enforceable	 labor	 and	 environmental	 standards’	 (emphasis	 in	 original)	 and	
‘thus	provide	“protections	that	have	been	absent	in	previous	agreements”’.	He	then	points	out	
that	key	provisions	in	the	Peru	FTA	also	prohibited	the	‘rollback	of	environmental	and	worker	
















blocking	 the	 ‘Devil's	 Curve’,	 a	 jungle	 highway	 near	 Bagua,	 600	 miles	 north	 of	
Lima.	 The	 protestors	 were	 demanding	 revocation	 of	 decrees	 providing	 new	
access	 to	 exploit	 their	 Amazonian	 lands	 for	 oil,	 gas	 and	 logging	 that	 had	 been	
enacted	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 FTA’s	 investor	 rights	 requirements.	 …	 What	 has	






was	 sold,	 at	 its	 heart	were	 the	 same	extreme	 investor	 rights	 that	 animated	 the	
North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA).	
	
Foreign	 corporations	 have	 used	 these	 investor‐state	 dispute	 settlement	 (ISDS)	
powers,	 both	 explicitly	 and	 behind	 the	 scenes,	 to	 pressure	 the	 Peruvian	
government	 to	pardon	polluters	and	to	strong‐arm	mining	concessions	 in	areas	
of	 the	country	where	 indigenous	communities	continue	to	rise	up	 in	opposition	
to	environmentally	damaging	projects.	…	And	Renco,	a	U.S.	firm,	sought	to	evade	
its	 contractual	 commitment	 to	 remediate	 environmental	 and	 health	 problems	




Former	Vice‐Minister	 Enchave	 (2015)	 concludes	 that,	 ‘Peru’s	 story	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 time	 to	
rethink	how	we	 approach	 trade	 agreements	 before	 “Fast	Tracking”	more	 of	 the	 same	 via	 the	
TPP’.	 ‘More	 of	 the	 same’	 will	 undoubtedly	 increase	 the	 types,	 and	 levels,	 of	 activity	 that	 are	
known	 to	 be	 contributors	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 environmental	 damage.	 As	 Monbiot	 (2015)	
puts	it,	they	will	‘promote	the	interests	of	transnational	capital	by	downgrading	the	defence	of	
human	 health,	 the	 natural	world,	 labour	 rights,	 and	 the	 poor	 and	 vulnerable	 from	 predatory	
corporate	 practices’.	 These	 deals	 to	 accelerate	 economic	 transactions	 and	 growth	 are	
encouraged	by	bodies	like	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	the	organisation	that	in	2015	shared	
the	platform	with	 the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme,	with	both	 acknowledging	 the	
need	to	‘do	more	to	ensure	that	trade	and	environmental	policies	work	better	together’.	Action	
and	 stated	 aspiration	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 disconnected,	 the	 implications	 of	 one	 for	 the	 other	




There	 is	 very	 strong	 scientific	 consensus	 and	 a	 heavy	 weight	 of	 evidence	 supporting	 the	
argument	that	climate	change	is	occurring,	that	the	rate	of	change	is	increasing,	and	that	this	is	
bad	 for	 the	 planet	 and	 its	 populations,	 human	 or	 non‐human	 (IPCC	 2013;	 Klein	 2014;	 Royal	
Society	and	US	National	Academy	of	Sciences	2014).	Furthermore,	this	is	occurring	at	the	time	
when	 other	 signals	 of	 local	 and	 global	 environmental	 damage	 are	 being	 recorded	 as	 serious	
(Milman	2015;	UNEP	2016).	However,	there	are	also	powerful	and	influential	sources	of	opinion	
–	scientific,	political,	 cultural	–	 that	variously	argue	 that	climate	change	 is	not	occurring,	or	at	
least	not	at	a	rate	that	cannot	be	remediated	by	technology,	or	that	some	version	of	it	is	but	this	




From	 a	 criminological	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 a	 range	 of	 criminal	 and	
environmental	 offences	 will	 be	 among	 the	 consequences	 of	 climate	 change	 that	 we	 should	
anticipate,	and	some	of	these	will	be	directly	caused	by,	arise	from,	or	be	subject	to,	attempts	to	
regulate,	mitigate,	adapt	and	enforce	 laws	(Agnew	2012;	Farrall	et	al.	2012;	Fussey	and	South	
2012;	Kramer	 2013;	 South	 2012:	 99‐102;	White	 2012a,	 2012b:	 4‐5).	 Among	 future	 effects	 of	





















this	case	 it	can	be	shown	that	 ‘skepticism	 is	not	 the	same	as	denial’	and	the	scepticism	of	 the	
farmers	 ‘can	 be	 understood	 and	 addressed	 by	 recognizing	 that	 other	 issues	may	 be	 of	more	
immediate	 concern	 to	 them,	 such	 as	 their	 business	 viability’.	 Thus,	 matters	 of	 personal	
investment	 in	 identity,	 land,	community	and	friendship	networks,	alongside	psychological	and	
cultural	 interpretations	 of	 climate	 change	 threats	 and	 challenges,	 need	 to	 be	 factored	 into	
messages	calling	for	change,	not	just	‘scientific	facts’.	If	the	latter	were	sufficiently	persuasive,	it	
might	 be	 assumed	 that	 ‘deniers’	 simply	need	 to	 be	 convinced	 that	 climate	 change	 is	 real	 and	
they	 will	 then	 support	 action.	 But	 changing	 minds	 so	 easily	 may	 actually	 be	 an	 ‘unlikely’	









cent	 to	 6	 per	 cent	 –	 which	 is	 still	 a	 small	 percentage	 but	 significant	 compared	 to	 zero.	 The	
authors	suggest	this	may	be	interpreted	in	the	following	ways:	for	example,	on	the	one	hand,	as	
a	‘manifestation	of	increasing	taken‐for‐grantedness	…	of	anthropogenic	climate	science’	or,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ‘rise	 in	 disagreement	may	be	 a	 result	 of	 increased	 funding	 of	 sceptics	 by	
fossil	 fuel	 industries,	 conservative	 foundations	 and	 think	 tanks’	 (Lefsrud	 and	 Meyer	 2012:	




ago	 but	 trends	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 dramatically	 reversing	 (see	 also	 Hamilton	 2013:	 16‐17).	
Furthermore,	if	votes	for	politicians	and	political	positions	are	an	indicator,	substantial	numbers	
of	citizens	in	Australia,	the	UK,	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	the	USA	are	not	seeing	green	issues	as	a	
major	 priority	 for	 their	 governments.	 Green	 parties	 may	 have	 grown	 but	 with	 only	 a	 few	
exceptions,	they	are	not	being	voted	into	positions	of	power.		
	
It	has	 to	be	emphasised	 that	 the	 lobby	representing	scepticism	or	 rejection	regarding	climate	
change	 evidence	 is	 powerful	 and	 influential	 but	 it	 is	 also	 quite	 diverse.	 It	 does	 not	 represent	
only	the	voices	of	the	fossil	fuel	energy	industry.	It	is	also	supported	by	other	interest	groups	as	
well	as	 those	 ‘ordinary	voters’	who	–	socially,	politically	and	culturally	–	strongly	support	 the	













polarized	 in	 their	attitudes	 towards	science’	 and	 that	since	 the	1970s,	 ‘Conservatives	–	unlike	
Liberals	 or	 Moderates	 –	 have	 become	 increasingly	 sceptical	 and	 distrustful	 of	 science’	 with	
‘Polarization	…	particularly	pronounced	with	respect	to	climate	change’.	The	key	proposition	–	
and	 one	 of	 significance	 for	 present	 purposes	 –	 is	 that	 ‘[p]eople	 who	 embrace	 a	 laissez‐faire	
vision	of	the	free	market	are	less	likely	to	accept	that	anthropogenic	greenhouse	gas	emissions	
are	warming	the	planet	than	people	with	an	egalitarian‐communitarian	outlook’	(Lewandosky	
et	 al.	 2013;	 see	 also	 Lewandowsky	 2011;	 Heath	 and	 Gifford	 2006).1	 Or,	 put	 another	 way,	
‘Endorsement	 of	 free	 markets	 in	 combination	 with	 other	 streaks	 of	 “hierarchical”	 or	
“authoritarian”	 thinking	 are	 statistically	 associated	 with	 rejection	 of	 climate	 science’	
(Lewandosky	2011).	Lewandosky	et	al.	 (2013)	 therefore	argue	 that	 the	 ‘driving	psychological	






or	 climate	 change,	 or	 environmental	 issues	 in	 general,	 but	 the	merit	 or	 otherwise	of	markets	







damaging	climate	change,	 governments	 can	be	 trusted	 to	act	 effectively	when	applying	either	
market	instruments	or	other	policies?’	(Robinson	2008b:	62).	As	noted	above,	governments	may	
say	 they	 ‘know’	 there	 is	 a	 challenge	 and	 promise	 ‘appropriate	 responses’	 but	 instead,	 as	
Robinson	 observes,	 ‘give	 priority	 to	 appearing	 to	 be	 doing	 something’.	 However,	 the	 main	
objective	of	Robinson’s	critique	 is	 to	deride	collective	political	efforts,	as	across	 the	European	
Union,	 for	 example,	 and	 the	value	of	 any	 role	played	by	 centralised	 state	 authorities.	 Instead,	
from	this	position,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	greater	benefits	–	 in	 this	case	as	 in	others	–	would	 follow	
from	‘reliance	on	market	responses,	which	permit	gradual	and	flexible	adjustment	to	perceived	





for	 you’.	 This	 is	 a	 political	 trait	with	 some	 similarities	 to	 the	 Authoritarian	 Personality	 Type	








the	 opportunity;	 A	 need	 for	 strong	 leadership	which	 displays	 uncompromising	
power;	A	belief	in	simple	answers	and	polemics	–	i.e.	The	media	controls	us	all	or	

















science	 routinely	 refer	 to	 global	 warming	 as	 a	 ‘conspiracy’	 or	 ‘hoax’,	 and	
conspiracist	 themes	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 climate	 media	 coverage	 and	 in	
people’s	affective	imagery	evoked	by	climate	change.		
	
All	 of	 this	 may	 reflect	 some	 of	 the	 evidence	 available	 regarding	 a	 decline	 in	 public	
understanding	of,	or	interest	in,	real	science	(at	least	in	the	USA,	although	similar	trends	may	be	
found	 elsewhere).	 For	 example,	 a	 2014	 USA	 National	 Science	 Foundation	 report	 indicated	 a	
growing	belief	 in	 the	USA	 in	 the	 credibility	of	 astrology.	This	occurred	most	obviously	where	
correlated	 with	 ‘less	 science	 education’	 and	 ‘less	 factual	 knowledge’	 (Mooney	 2014).	 Where	
science	is	dismissed	or	not	understood,	then	scientific	topics,	no	matter	how	significant,	will	not	
engage	attention	or	meet	with	calls	 for	action.	However,	even	among	the	scientifically	 literate	
and	 those	knowledgeable	 about	 climate	 change,	 other	 forms	of	 stakeholder	priorities	may	be	
dominant	(Kuehne	2014).	So	in	Norgaard’s	(2006:	347)	study	of	a	rural	community	in	Norway,	
findings	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 a	 ‘significant	 population’	 who	 certainly	 do	 ‘know	 about	 and	
express	concern	for	global	warming’	but	where	the	study	data	indicated	that	‘non‐response’	to	
climate	 change	 was	 ‘at	 least	 partially’	 based	 on	 socially	 organized	 denial	 and	 collective	 self‐





largely	caused	by	human	actions),	 for	 those	who	are	opposed	to	 the	science	and	the	message,	





Lewandowsky	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 the	 climate	 change	 narrative	 represents	 a	 source	 of	
subversion	of	conventional	and	conservative	beliefs.	It	poses:		
	
…	 [a]	 deep	 psychological	 threat	 that	 in	 part	 explains	 the	 hyper‐emotionality	 of	
the	 anti‐science	 discourse:	 the	 fear	 of	 Obama	 as	 an	 alien	 ‘other’;	 frenetic	
alarmism	 about	 a	 ‘world	 government’;	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘warmist’	 or	 ‘extremist’	





2011).	 The	 counter	 responses	 can	 range	 from	 the	 relatively	 modest	 desire	 to	 maintain	 the	
status	quo	and	respect	for	existing	hierarchies,	through	the	promotion	of	authoritarian	views,	to	
a	belief	that	there	is	no	problem	or,	if	there	is,	then	solutions	will	be	delivered	by	higher	forces	–	








I	 began	 by	 quoting	 Cohen	 (2001)	 on	 ‘denial’.	 Recently,	 Bandura	 (2016)	 has	 explored	 some	
similar	 questions	 in	 his	 book	 Moral	 Disengagement:	 How	 People	 Do	 Harm	 and	 Live	 With	
Themselves.	In	the	final	chapter	to	this	book,	Bandura	considers	the	challenge	of	climate	change	
and	 threats	 to	 environmental	 sustainability	 –	 ‘the	 most	 urgent	 issue	 facing	 humankind	 this	
century’	(Bandura	2016:	372).	The	discussion	highlights	the	problem	of	moral	disengagement	
which	allows	the	persistence	of	harmful	environmental	policies	and	practices	on	the	basis	that	
they	 have	 legitimate	 purposes,	 justified	 for	 political	 and	 popular	 consumption	 in	 ‘sanitized,	
convoluted	and	innocuous	language’	(Bandura	2016:	399).		
	
Such	 justifications	 and	 use	 of	 language	 are	 one	 set	 of	 means	 by	 which	 challenges	 to	 the	




political	 participation	 and	 control	 of	 economic	 initiative’.	 For	 Ruggiero,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
powerful	will	mean	the	pursuit	and	defence	of	the	status	quo,	with	the	aim	of	‘neutralizing	the	
legitimacy	of	collective	claims’	against	the	dominant	narratives	and	uncontrolled	enactments	of	
growth,	 exploitation	 and	 commodification.	 Along	 similar	 lines,	 Monbiot	 (2015)	 asks	 whether	
‘[i]n	 an	 age	 of	 ecocide,	 food	 banks	 and	 financial	 collapse,	 do	 we	 need	more	 protection	 from	




The	 tragedy	 is	 that,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 urgency	 of	 actually	 dealing	with	 the	 challenge	 of	
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